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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of WWII on Soviet economic growth.
Part I documents WWII's impact on the Soviet economy between 1939 and
1953 using available Soviet and Western statistics. Part II puts the
impact of WWII in perspective by developing a measure of the burden
which the economic cost of the war imposed upon the population. Part I
also examines the potential for a reduction in the postwar burden of
WWII had additional foreign assistance become available. Part III offers
some speculations on the cost to the Soviets of "winning" WWII.

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth, 1940-1953
The impact of World War II on the Soviet economy has received little
scholarly attention in the West, not because the economic impact was
considered unimportant, but because the period from 1940 to 1953 more than any
other in Soviet history is characterized by a paucity of economic data. For
over a decade, Nove's Economic History of the USSR (1969) remained the primary
Western source regarding the countours of the Soviet war effort. Beyond this,
little attention has been devoted to the structural changes brought about by
WWII. No one, for example, has examined in any detail the quantitative impact
on planning, production, or distribution patterns which resulted from i) the
long-term increase in female labor force participation rates, ii) the movement
of industry to the East, iii) technology transfer in the form of Lend Lease
aid or reparations, or iv) new territories annexed during WWII. Even less
attention has focused on the impact of WWII on Soviet national policy.
Zaleski (1980) and Dunmore (1980) stand alone in their respective examinations
of the impact of WWII on planning practices and regional policy. Textbooks on
the Soviet economy at most devote only a paragraph or two as transition from
the late 1930s to early 1950s. Fortunately, this situation is reversing as
more scholars are beginning serious analyses of the war period.
This paper examines the impact of WWII on Soviet economic growth. Part I
documents WWII's impact on the Soviet economy between 1939 and 1953 using
available Soviet and Western statistics. In addition to identifying the war's
impact on aggregate economic indices, disaggregated data on the industrial
sector, labor force, and household consumption are also analyzed. Part II
puts the impact of WWII into perspective by developing a measure of the burden
which the economic cost of the war imposed upon the postwar population.
Calculations by various methods yield estimates of the postwar replacement
cost of total material (non-human) war losses ranging from approximately 8 to
10 years' earnings of the 1945 labor force, supporting the Soviet claim that
WWII cost two Five-Year Plans (Tamarchenko, 1967, p. 135). The carryover war
cost [1] estimates initially presented in Part II include the reduction in the
postwar burden resulting from foreign aid and reparation payments received
between 1945 and 1953. As such, they do not represent the true cost of WWII
to the Soviet people. It is possible, however, to roughly estimate the impact
of reparations and other foreign aid ("pipeline" Lend Lease, United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration funds) on postwar recovery efforts.
The estimates derived in Part II indicate a contribution of some 1 to 5 years'
earnings of the 1945 labor force. That is, had reparations and aid not been
received, the postwar burden of WWII would have been substantially higher in
the USSR. Part II also examines the potential for a reduction in the postwar
burden of WWII had additional foreign assistance (the proposed US loan,
Marshall Plan aid) become available. A comparison is made between the impact
on postwar recovery efforts and Soviet economic growth potential of additional
aid with that of reparations/aid actually received from 1945 to 1953. The
results indicate that within the framework employed in this paper, Stalin was
perfectly rational in declining Marshall Plan assistance. Part III offers
some speculations on the cost to the Soviets of "winning" WWII.
The Appendix following this essay is an edited version of a paper written
in 1944 for the US Office of Strategic Services by Wassily Leontief (1973
Nobel Laureat). The primary focus of his paper was to describe capital
reconstruction and postwar development of Soviet national income and
consumption. Two scenarios are depicted in his counterfactual analysis
including one in which postwar military expenditures return to the 1938 level,
reconstruction proceeds without the help of foreign credits, but domestic gold
stocks are depleted for 3 years to finance reconstruction. In the second
scenario, foreign credits are available to the extent of $1.5 billion per year
for 3 years. Leontief calculated in 1944 that the rate of reconstruction
would not be greatly increased should foreign aid become available, making
only a few months difference in terms of restoring investment levels.
Leontief s previously unpublished findings were made available exclusively for
inclusion in this volume for comparison purposes, since both the methodology
and results are strikingly similar to those presented in this essay.
I. Impact of World War II on Soviet Economy
The Soviet effort in WWII began in June 1941 with the German invasion,
"Operation Barbarossa," and found itself at a disadvantage early on, both
militarily and economically. In spite of vast natural resource reserves, high
quotas of the initial Five-Year Plans required extensive exploitation of
European Russia. As a result, the resource base in eastern regions of the
USSR remained largely untapped. Correspondingly, no real efforts had been
made prior to 1941 to urbanize or develop transportation facilities in the
East. Moreover, the purges in 1936-37 of top political, economic, and
military leaders caused a substantial prewar decline in industrial output
(Katz 1975).
Within 6 months of the invasion, German forces occupied or isolated
territory which prior to WWII accounted for over 60% of total coal, pig iron,
and aluminum production; nearly 40% of total grain production; and 60% of
total livestock/ Moreover, this area contained 40% of prewar Soviet
population, 32% of the state enterprise labor force, and one-third of the
fixed capital assets of the state enterprise sector (Nove, 1982, p. 271). The
speed of the German advance impinged upon Soviet evacuation efforts, but from
July to November 1941, over 6 million people and 1,523 industrial enterprises
were removed to eastern regions (Urals, West Siberia. Central Asia,
Kazakhstan), of which 1,360 were large scale enterprises (employing more than
100-500 people). An additional 150 enterprises were evacuated from behind the
Leningrad and Stalingrad fronts in 1942-43 [2]. The magnitude of the
evacuation effort and detailed relocation data are described and analyzed by
Hunter (chapter 2) and Lieberman (chapter 3).
Evacuation, occupation, and conversion to military production caused a
severe decline in aggregate output. Not until March 1942 did industrial output
regain its 1940 level. Indeed, 1942 marks the turning point of the Soviet war
effort. By the end of that year, the Soviets had regained occupied areas, and
industrial output in eastern regions had increased over twofold its 1940
level. These gains were not sufficient, however, to offset the detrimental
Table 1: Soviet War Budget
1940 19-41
Uses of funds, non- financial
A. Defence outlays
B. Outlays on the national economy
of which:
C. All industry
D Heavy and machine tool industry only
E. Agriculture (excludes piocurement)
F. MTS only
G. Transport and communications
H. Housing and communal services
I. Trade and agricultural procurement
J. Social-cultural outlays
of which:
K. Education <St enlightenment
L. Health and physical culture
M. Grants to families
N. Social insurance
O. Social maintenance
P Administration
Q Total non-financial uses above
R. Other, unidentified uses of funds'
S. Total expenditures chargeable against
ordinary receipts
of which
T. Republic and local budget non-finanaal
outlays
Sources of funds
U. Enterprise prom withdrawals
V Turnover tax receipts
w Toiai above lU r V)
X. Income lax Ironi cooperatives, xolkhozy, etc.
Y. Income oi the MTS
Z Transfer ol cash balances oi socialized
sector
41 3 1
1942 1943 1944 194} 1941-45 1946
(Billions of I960 rubles)
5-7 8-3 10-8 12-5 13-8 12 8 58-2 7-4
5-8 5-2 3-2 3-3 5-4 7.4 24-4 10-6
2-9 3 1-8 1-8 31 4-4 140 7-0
2-6 2-8 1-7 1-6 2-8 3-9 12-8 n.a.
1-3 0-9 0-5 0-5 0-7 0-9 3-6 1-3
0-8 0-6 0-3 0-3 0-4 0-5 21 n.a.
0-7. 0-6 0-4 0-6 0-9 1 • 1 3-6 1-2
0-3 01 01 01 0-2 0-3 0-8 0-4
0-2 n.a. n.a. 0-1 0-1 0-2 n.a. 3
30 3-8 51 6-3 21-3
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1941-45
I Billions of I960 rubles)
80
2-2 1-5 10 1-3 2-1 2-6 3-5 3-8
0-9 0-7 0-7 0-8 10 1- 1 4-3 1 -4
01 01 01 01 01 0-2 0-7 0-4
0-5 0-3 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 1-7 n.a.
0-4 0-6 11 1-3 1-7 20 6-6 21
0-7 0-5 0-4 0-5 0-7 0-9 3-
1
1-2
16-3 171 17-4 20-1 250 27-4 1070 27-4
0-8 1-7 0-7 0-7 II 21 6-3 4-9
17-1 18-8 181 20-8 26-
1
29-5 113-3 32 I
4-2 31 2-2 2-6 3-8 4-8 16-5 6-6
1946
1 .
1
2-4 1-5 20 2 1 1-7 9-7 1-7
10-6 9-3 6-6 7-1 9-5 12-3 44-9 191
128 11-7 3 1 9-1 11-6 140 54-6 20-8
0-3 0-3 0-2 0-3 0-3 0-3 1-7 0-3
0-2 0-1 01 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-4 n.i.
— 2 — — — — 20 —
AA Direct taxes and lees irom population
of which
BB Agricultural (ax
CC Income tax
DD Housing and cultural lax
EE. Taxes on oacnetors. one-person anu
childless lamilies
I r War lax
L1C1 War lottery receipts
HH Money yjjts 10 Ked Armv A Delervce luikls
J J Total above (AA <- GO * HH)
KK I oi.al la-ies and collections
LI. Other repuolic and local non -financial incon*
MM SoLial insurance contributions
NN Total n<m- financial >otirce> ol timds above
OO (Jther^inideiiiilicxl yiuri.c. 01 lunds*
PP Total non-tuiancial sources ol tund-.
ol which
QC Kepuolic and local budgets
I I
2-9 40 13-3
0-2 0-2 01 4 0-5 0-6 1 3 n.a
0-4 0-5 0-3 0-6 0-9 1 1 3 4 n a.
0-4 U-4 0-2 — — — 0-6 n.a
—
1 0- 1 0-2 0-3 0-3 n a
1 4 1 -7 : 1 20 - ; _
— 0-
1 0-2 0-3 0-5 — 1-: —
— o : 0-5 0-5 0-5 0-1 1-3 —
0-9 1 4 2 9 3-7 4 7 4 1 16-8 5 1
0-2 o-i U-2 0-3 0-6 Oo 20 n a.
0-4 0-5 0-3 4 0-5 0-6 2 3 n.a.
0-9 0-6 0-7 0-9 1 3 9 12
15 * 16 8 12 4 14 6 IS-" 20 " S3
"
24 6
1 : -0 5 2 6 3 3 4 9 ft- I 16" 5 4
16 ^ 16-3 15 17 ^ 23 6 2" IU0-4 30
3 9 1 I 2-6 3 5 4 I 15-5 6-2
Source: Millar (1980), pp. 109-111
impact of the "scorched earth" campaigns and wartime losses on aggregate
output. National income at the end of the war was still some 20% below its
prewar level. Agricultural production did not regain its prewar level until
after WWII ended as Nove (chapter 4) and Fitzpatrick (chapter 7) indicate in
their detailed analyses of WWII's impact on the agricultural sector.
Millar (1980) offers a seminal analysis of the financial aspects of the
Soviet effort in WWII. Indeed, he traces the impact of war costs and
structural changes in the war economy using the sources and uses of State
Budget funds for the war years. Because the State Budget is so comprehensive
in the USSR, including all investment flows in the economy as well as military
and non-defense categories of expenditure, Millar is able by analyzing
budgetary data to provide a relatively detailed sketch of the magnitude of the
Soviet war effort. His war budget table is reproduced here in part (see Table
1) to facilitate explanation of the impact of WWII on aggregate economic
indices (lines a,b,j,p). Most striking is the increase in defense outlays
(line a) which rose from 33% of all budget non-financial uses of funds in 1940
to nearly 60% in 1942, averaging over 50% for the war period [3]. As Millar
points out, the defense category of the State Budget understates total war-
related expenditures because of the exclusion of outlays connected with the
conversion of plant, equipment, and manpower to war production, and the
additional civilian administrative costs occasioned by WWII. These costs are
examined in more detail by Lieberman (chapter 3).
Perhaps more than anything else, Table 1 indicates the relative and
absolute decline in non-defense outlays during WWII, in addition to
documenting the impact on the economy of the loss of some 20 to 50 million
Table 2
Actual and Planned Soviet National
Income: 1940, 1944, 1945, 1950
(billion rubles, 1940 prices)
1940 % 1944 % 1945 % 1950
(Actual) (Actual) (Actual) (Plan)
National Income 377 .4 100.0 303.1 100.0 331.1 100.0 504.5 100.0
1. Consumption 279.3 74.0 188.3 60.5 217.7 65.8 366.0 72.5
a. Households 264.3 70.0 150.0 49.5 188.5 56.9 351.0 69.6
b. Military Personne 1 15.0 4.0 33.3 11.0 29.2 8.8 15.0 3.0
2. Investment 66.1 17.5 40.6 13.4 48.8 14.7 103.5 20.5
a. Fixed Capital 40.5 10.7 22.7 7.5 27.9 8.4 56.6 11.2
b. Livestock. 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.5 5.0 1.0
c. Inventories 25.5 6.8 17.8 5.9 19.4 5.8 38.0 7.5
Industrial 18.5 4.9 14.6 4.8 15.0 4.5 30.0 5.9
Agricultural 7.0 1.9 3.2 1.1 4.4 1.3 8.0 1.6
3. Defense 27.0 8.5 76.9 26.1 62.3 19.5 29.0 6.9
4. Other 5.0 1.3 2.3 0.8 2.3 0.7 6.0 1.2
SOURCE:
E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press 1980) p. 352.
people [4] and 30% of the capital stock. The adverse effect upon household
consumption was particularly severe, falling from 74% of national income in
1940 to 66% of a lower national income in 1945. This occurred at a time when
grain stocks were reduced to augment consumption (see Table 2, and Nove's
discussion in chapter 4), and social security payments (which include payments
to families of those killed or disabled in WWII) were rising (Table 1: lines
m, n, o) . Official Soviet sources report that capital formation also declined
drastically during WWII, from 19% in 1940 to 4% in 1942. Indeed, the prewar
rate of capital formation was not regained at any time during the war
(Tamarchenko, pp. 50-51). Hence, expenditures on the war effort rose at the
expense of consumption and investment, from 11% of national income in 1940 to
a high of 44% in 1943. Yet, as Millar (p. 112) indicates, citing the official
Soviet history of WWII, even this share understates the fraction of real
national income that was absorbed by the war effort by some 15% in 1942.
Impact on Industry
WWII caused both short and long-term changes in the Soviet industrial
sectors in terms of the level of production, composition of output, and
regional emphasis. In total, some 31,850 large industrial enterprises were
"put out of production" (although not all were completely destroyed) during
WWII (Voznesensky, 1948, p. 95). This figure represents more than 80% of the
prewar number of industrial enterprises located in the Ukraine, Belorussia,
and the occupied areas of the RSFSR. From 1941-1945, the composition of
industrial output adjusted to meet the needs of the war effort (see Table 3).
Reconstruction priorities dictated the emphasis on heavy industry in the
Table
Distribution by Sector of Soviet Industrial Output, 1940-1950
(percent of gross industrial output)
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950 (Plan)
1950 (Actual)
ndustry Defense Industry Light Industry
ector
61.2
"B" Sector
38.8
n.a. n.a. n.a.
20.5 63.9 15.6
22.1 58.3 19.6
28.1 51.3 20.6
34.5
65.9
66.0
67.4
70.6
66.0
72.4
40.1 25.4
34.1
34.0
32.4
29.4
34.0
27.6
n.a. = Not available,
Sources: Narodnoe khoziaistva SSSR v 1972 g. , p. 162; G. Kravchenko,
Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1970),
p. 351.
postwar period as is evident in Table 4. In spite of this, light industry
experienced more rapid gains in the immediate postwar period (Table 5).
More long-term in nature was the impact of WWII on the location of
industry. New construction in eastern regions was exceedingly rapid in the
first two years of WWII. Capital investment in heavy industry directed to the
Urals and Western Siberia rose from 13% in 1940, to nearly 40% in 1942
(Sokolov, 1946, p. 20). Evacuation and recruitment policies generated a 65%
increase in the industrial workforce in the Urals and Volga regions between
1940 and 1943 (Voznesensky , p. 65). The combined result of these policies was
an expansion of industrial output in the eastern regions from 3.94 billion
(new) [5] rubles in 1940, to 9.12 billion in 1944 (Voznesensky, p. 46).
Dunmore (pp. 35-7) suggests, however, that the long-term nature of the
locational shift should not be overestimated. First, the growth of industrial
production in eastern regions was concentrated in the defense sector, possibly
exaggerating the extent of wartime industrial growth. Second, although
defense production expanded in the East, output of foodstuffs, timber, and
construction materials in this region fell substantially during WWII. "To
claim that the war gave the eastern areas a greatly expanded base for postwar
industrial growth is to ignore the disproportionalities between sectors within
that base" (Dunmore, p. 36). Third, the quality of wartime construction in
the East was significantly lower than peacetime norms because of the urgency
with which these industrial enterprises were built, thereby shortening the
life of both the buildings and equipment. Fourth, reconstruction in western
regions took priority over industry expansion in the East. In part this was
because reconstruction efforts focused on civilian (heavy) industry as opposed
Table *f
Distribution of Soviet Industrial Investment by Sector,
1938-1950
(percent)
3rd FYP WWII 4th FYP
1938-1941 1941-1945 1946-1950
Heavy Industry 84.5 93.3 87.9
Ferrous metals 7.1 12.0 10.9
Chemicals 4.7 3.6 3.7
Oil and gas 7.4 7.9 11.5
Coal 6.2 9.8 15.5
Electric power 7.8 6.3 7.6
Machine-bldg 33.5 34.4 16.4
Construction and materials 4.6 5.5 9.4
Forestry, paper,
wood-processing 3.5 2.5 4.8
Light Industry 15.5 6.7 12.1
Total 100 100 100
Source: Kapital'noe Stroitel' stvo v SSSR (1961), pp. 66-7.
Table b
Sectoral Increases in Soviet Industrial Output, 1945-1950
(output in percent of previous year)
Heavy Industry Light Industry
"A" Sector
'
"B" Sector
1945 82 109
1946 73 114
1947 123 122
1948 129 121
1949 125 108
1950 126 115
Source: Calculated from Narodnoe khoziaistva SSSR v 1972 g , p. 195
to armaments production which predominated in the East. In 1944, "liberated
areas" received a greater share of capital investment in 1944 than in 1940
(Kravchenko, p. 221). Lastly, reconstruction efforts in western regions
employed the latest technology, while "new" plants in the East utilized old
technology and evacuated equipment.
Impact on Population and Labor Force
The most pervasive impact of WWII in the USSR is found in the devastating
human loss incurred by the war. The 1939 census reports 170.6 million people
living in the 1939 territory, and approximately 20 million living in the newly
acquired territory [6]. This puts the 1939 Soviet population in present
boundaries at 190.7 million. A rough estimate, based on a 2.5% annual
increase in population, puts the 1959 population at 240 million, but the 1959
census shows only 208.8 million people. The correspondingly adverse affect of
WWII on the workforce is shown in Table 6.
A direct result of these war-related population losses is found in the
excess number of women relative to men. A detailed analysis of the
composition of wartime population loss is provided by Fitzpatrick (chapter
7). In 1939, the number of women in the USSR exceeded that of men by some 7
million. By 1959, there were 20 million more women than men, and almost all
of this surplus was concentrated among women 32 years old and older. Anderson
and Silver (chapter 10) examine the socio-demographic consequences of these
wartime population losses, with particular emphasis on the impact on non-
Russian nationalities.
An indirect consequence of WWII stems from the postwar industrialization
drive which was influenced not only by reconstruction efforts, but also by the
Table
Soviet Employment and Wage Data, 1940-1953
Average annual
industrial workforce
(millions)
8.3
7.8
5.5
n.a.
n.a.
7.2
10.2
11.0
12.1
12.9
14.1
14.9
15.5
n.a.
Workers and salaried officials in national economy, excludes
collective farm workers and military personnel.
Post 1961 rubles.
Source: Trud v SSSR (1968) p. 22; Narodnoe khoziaistva SSSR (1956), p.
189; G. Kravchenko, Voennaia ekonomika SSSR, 1941-1945 (1963),
pp. 98, 218; Promyshlennost SSSR (1964), p. 84.
Average Average
annual employment annual wage
,
(new rubles)(millions)
•
1940 31.2 397
1941 27.4 n.a.
1942 18.4 n.a.
1943 19.4 n.a.
1944 23.6 n.a.
1945 23.7 521
1946 30.6 570
1947 32.1 683
1948 34.3 723
1949 36.1 745
1950 38.9 767
1951 40.7 791
1952 42.2 807
1953 43.7 815
USSR's emergence from WWII as a major world power. The impact of these
conditions is evident on postwar rural-urban distribution patterns.
Historically, the majority of Russians lived in rural areas: in 1913, only 18%
of the population lived in urban centers; in 1939, less than one-third. Yet by
1959, almost half (48%) lived in urban areas. Indeed, the urban population
rose from 60 to 100 million people from 1939 to 1959, while over this same 20
year span, the rural population fell from 130 to 109 million (Schwartz, 1961,
p. 109). The impact of the rapid postwar growth in urbans areas is documented
by Fitzpatrick (chapter 7). Bubis and Ruble (chapter 9) examine postwar
rural-urban distribution patterns in detail for Leningrad, and their
implications for Party membership and leadership.
Another consequence of WWII is found in the shift in population to the
East. Some 47 million people were located in eastern regions in 1939. By
1959, this figure reached 63 million. During the same period, Kazakhstan
experienced a 50% increase in population (6.1 to 9.3 million), while the
population west of the Urals rose only from 144 to 146 million (Schwartz, p.
109). Nove (chapter 4) provides a vivid description of the movement east by
the peasantry.
Mobilizing sufficient labor resources for the war effort involved
strengthening labor discipline codes and imposing restrictions on labor
mobility and individual employment choice. An October 1940 decree authorized
compulsory transfer of engineers, technicians, and skilled workers from one
enterprise to another. In July 1941, this right was granted to a number of
regional and provincial committees, allowing for forced assignment of certain
military personnel and workers to jobs in agriculture, industry, and
10
construction. A decree in December 1941 forbade workers in war industries to
leave jobs for the duration of the war, and in September 1941, another decree
extended this to transport workers and workers in areas near the front.
Additional restrictive decrees were issued in April and May, 1943 (Shigalin,
1960, pp. 240-41). The impact of these policies on the distribution of the
industrial labor force is shown in part in Tables 7 and 8, and described in
more detail in Fitzpatrick (chapter 7).
The impact on labor recruitment and mobilization for the war effort was
most pronounced as a result of the February 1942 decree which required the
labor services of all men between the ages of 16 and 55, and all women 16-45
years old. Over 730,000 civilians were mobilized; 565,900 from urban areas,
168,000 from rural areas. Of these, 191,000 were sent to war industries
(Shigalin, p. 242).
In addition to direct controls over labor to offset the manpower shortages
resulting from occupation losses and increased military service, other
policies were adopted during WWII to combat declines in industrial production,
including: lengthening the working day 1 to 3 hours, suspending vacations,
emphasizing the replacement of male with female labor, and additional
training. From June to December 1941, nearly 1 million housewives and
schoolgirls (grades 8-10) were brought into the production process. The
proportion of women in the total labor force rose from 38% in 1940, to 53% in
1942, reaching 55% by 1945. In industry, women represented 41% of the
workforce in 1940, 52% in 1942 (59% in the electric industry in 1942)
( Zhenshchina , 1960, p. 35, Kravchenko, p. 99). Kravchenko (pp. 97-8) also
reports actions taken to train skilled workers, declaring that in 1942, for
Table 7
Regional Distribution of Soviet Industrial Labor
Force: 1940, 1945, 1950
(thousands)
1940 Z of total 1945 % of total 1950 % of total
industrial industrial industrial
labor force labor force labor force
USSR 13079 100 10665 100 15317 100
RSFSR 9025 69.0 8076 75.7 10827 70.7
Siberia and Far East 881 6.7 1231 11.5 1752 11.4
Ukraine 2614 20.0 1256 11.8 2509 16.4
Belorussia 394 3.0 152 1.4 346 2.3
Moldavia 23 0.2 30 0.3 52 0.3
Lithuania 6 0.4 50 0.5 97 0.6
Latvia 113 0.9 75 0.7 171 1.1
Estonia 73 0.6 55 0.5 106 0.7
Georgia 130 1.0 125 1.2 175 1.1
Armenia 44 0.3 45 0.4 81 0.5
Azerbaidzhan 139 1.1 124 1.2 173 1.1
Uzbekistan 182 1.4 239 2.2 254 1.7
Kazakhstan 177 1.4 304 2.8 365 2.4
Kirgizia 36 0.3 55 0.5 66 0.4
Tadzhikistan 31 0.2 33 0.3 44 0.3
Turkmenistan 41 0.3 46 0.4 51 0.3
Source: Trud v SSSR (1967) pp. , 42-71; Dokuchaev Rabochii klass (1973) p. 43; Dokuchaev
Raboi:hii klass (1972) p. 48.
Table 8
Distribution of Manual Work Force by Industrial
Sector: 1940, 1950
1940 1950 1950
# of workers % of total # of workers % of total
(thousands) manual (thousands) manual workers (1940=100)
workforce
Heavy Industry 6476 65.0 8794 71.9
Coal 436 4.4 733 6.0
Electric power 108 1.1 131 1.1
Ferrous metals 405 4.1 605 4.9
Chemicals 297 3.0 332 2.7
Machine-bldg and
metal-working 2575 25.8 3332 27.3
Light Industry 3495 35.0 3432 28.1
All Industry 9971 100.0 12226 100.0
136
168
121
149
112
129
98
123
Source: Trud v SSSR (1967) pp. 84-5.
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example, 80% of all industrial workers took training courses. A parallel
effort was made to train tractor drivers and agricultural mechanics.
A final consequence of WWII on the Soviet population and labor force
entails the war's impact on forced labor. One US estimate puts the number of
persons in concentration camps in 1948 at 13 million (Schwartz, 1949, p.
116). Other estimates range from 2-3 million to 20 million (Jasny, 1951, pp.
405- 07). Forced labor supplies included German prisoners, other enemy
soldiers, and "politically dangerous" Soviet citizens (returning military
personnel, former kulaks, religious officials, and political or minority group
dissidents). An excellent discussion of conscript and convict labor is
provided by Fitzpatrick in chapter 7.
Impact on Household Consumption
A comparison of money incomes and expenditures of Soviet households in
1940 and 1945 yields some insight into the impact of WWII on civilian
consumption patterns (see Table 10). Wages, salaries, and other payments
(including military pay) in 1945 exceeded the 1940 level by some 2.3 billion
rubles, in spite of restrictive wartime policies over wages (see Table 6).
Income from the sale of products in collective farm markets rose fourfold (by
9.4 billion rubles) from 1940 to 1945 as a result of wartime food shortages.
Similar wartime increases are found in the pensions and allowances category of
household income which rose from .73 billion rubles in 1940, to 2.37 billion
in 1945. In spite of these increases, however, the share of total consumption
in national income was much lower in 1945 than in 1940 (see Table 2), despite
the fact that the 1945 level of national income was lower than that of 1940.
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Additional insight regarding the impact of WWII on civilian household
consumption is found in war-related rationing practices adopted to mobilize
resources for the war effort. The first rationing decree (July 1941) affected
Moscow, Leningrad, and the surrounding provinces (21 urban areas, 17
districts), and encompassed such products as bread, macaroni, sugar, butter,
fat, groats, meat and meat products, and fish. In addition, a number of
manufactured products were rationed: cotton, linen, and rayon fabrics, ready-
made clothes, leather and rubber shoes, and soap. Rationing was extended to
different products, and to different cities and provinces, as the war wore on.
The magnitude of war-related rationing is best illustrated by the number
of individuals actually involved in the rationing process. The Commissariat
of Trade (under which was officed the Administration for Rationed Supplies)
supervised the centralized allocation of consumer goods. As Zaleski (p. 351)
reports, administratively, this occupied 14,000 persons in 3,100 offices at
the end of the war, with some 13,000 persons working in 1,900 control offices
to supervise the distribution of ration cards, which in turn employed 400,000
individuals (although only 20% were full-time) to actually distribute ration
cards in industrial enterprises and apartment organizations. Nearly 61
million people in urban areas were affected by rationing in 1941. By 1944,
this figure had risen to 76.8 million. In December 1945, 80.6 million Soviet
people were supplied with bread under the rationing system (of which some 26.8
million lived in rural areas). Needless to say, the results of the vast
apparatus of distribution and control were not always satisfactory either to
the state or the Soviet people.
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Impact on Economic Growth
World War II caused a severe setback in the growth of Soviet output. The
ground lost in terms of the growth rate was not recovered by 1953, nor even by
1961. In large part this stems from the reduction in Soviet population and
labor force, not only of the losses immediately attributable to WWII, but also
from the reduction of the Soviet leadership's capacity to expand the labor
force.
Also contributing to the detrimental impact of WWII on the aggregate
growth rate of the economy was the long-term character of the 30% loss of
capital stock. The nature of this loss includes direct destruction, curtailed
investemnt, and hence, a reduction in productive capacity not only during
WWII, but also for an indefinitely long period after the war. Available data
(Moorsteen and Powell, 1966, p. 386) suggest that had it been possible to
maintain the investment growth rate indicated by prewar trends, the absolute
volume of investment realized in each of the post-1950 years would have been
achieved 6 to 7 years earlier, or alternatively, would have exceeded actual
investment in each year by some 80%. From this it follows that it was not the
case that the value of fixed capital stock, having regained its prewar level
sometime in 1949 (Moorsteen and Powell, p. 322), was thereafter unaffected by
the impact of WWII.
A conventional method for analyzing the impact of WWII on Soviet economic
growth examines the war's impact on the level of capital, labor and other
inputs, and changes in their productivity. Moorsteen and Powell (pp. 314-379)
compiled sufficient data on Soviet employment, capital stock, capital-labor
and capital-output ratios, and input productivity measures to put together a
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rough sketch of WWII's impact on Soviet economic growth potential in the
immediate postwar period.
An important consequence of WWII on Soviet economic growth potential
involved the acquisition of new territory. New territory brought under Soviet
domain not only additional land and capital stock, but also additional labor.
The impact on employment of acquiring new territory was more pronounced in the
industrial sector than in agriculture, although both sectors exhibited
significant if only temporary labor force increases. A comparison of 1940 and
1945-46 employment figures -(Moorsteen and Powell, p. 365) shows a war-related
reduction in agricultural employment, caused not only by wartime losses from
German occupation and destruction, but also from substantial numbers of
agricultural workers who joined the Red Army, and when demobilized, found (or
were assigned) employment in urban industrial centers. Included in these
agricultural employment figures is the increase in the labor force which
resulted from higher wartime and postwar female labor force participation.
For the nonagricultural sector, WWII's impact was similar with respect to
higher female labor force participation. Indeed, measured in 1937 man-years
and adjusted for changes in hours, total employment in this sector in 1945
exceeded that of 1940. Tremendous war-related population losses had an
adverse effect upon Soviet labor force growth potential, however, Prewar
increases in total employment (approximately 3% from 1928 to 1940) were more
than halved as a result of WWII (1% increase in total employment 1945-1961).
The war-related annexation of new territory also allowed for an expansion
of sown area, from 137.7 million hectares in 1939 to 150.4 million in 1940
(Moorsteen and Powell, p. 366). The devastating impact of WWII is clearly
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seen in the reduction of sown land by 1945, in comparison with that of the
1928 area. As Nove (chapter 4) points out, not until 1948 was the prewar
figure of sown land attained (not until 1951 using current boundaries). This
holds in spite of the expansion of agricultural production in the East.
Johnson (1963) suggests that as far as grain yields were concerned, the
expansion of territory did not greatly alter average quality of sown land.
The impact of WWII on Soviet capital-output and capital-labor ratios was
pronounced. The average capital-output ratio (computed as the ratio of net
capital stock to GNP in 1937 prices) rose irregularly in the prewar period
(from 1.68 in 1928, to 1.93 in 1940). At war's end, it had reached 2.01,
rising to 2.10 in 1946, before falling, and remaining below 2 until after 1953
(Moorsteen and Powell, pp. 367-8). Wartime devastation of capital stock and
slow assimilation of foreign technology would account for these changes, as
would reconstruction priorities favoring heavy industry. The capital-output
ratio in nonagricultural sectors behaved broadly like that of the total,
although the increase over the 25 year period from 1928 to 1953 was less. The
extremely high ratio for housing reflects, in addition to the usual factors
making for a high capital intensity in this sector, the low level of official
rents in the Soviet Union. A comparison of pre and postwar capital-labor
ratios reflects, perhaps more than anything else, the differential impact of
WWII on the growth rates of capital and labor.
Productivity is cited as a major factor in explaining growth in any
industrialized economy. The disruptive effects of war on productivity are no
doubt pervasive. Low productivity during the war and initial postwar period
is expected, perhaps unavoidable, because of the conversion to and from
16
military production. It is not clear, however, that the overall impact of war
on productivity will necessarily be unfavorable. War may impede technological
developments in some areas while stimulating it in others. Moreover, even
though war disrupts the functioning of existing administrative agencies, it
does provide an opportunity for eliminating bureaucratic rigidities. The
pervasive, yet somewhat obscure, nature of WWII's impact on several
productivity measures is we 11 -documented by Moorsteen and Powell (pp. 370,
378-9).
The delayed reaction of WWII in terms of growth rates, the "economic
miracle" of the 1950s in which West Germany and Japan each recovered rapidly
from a substantial degree of wartime devastation, did not occur in the Soviet
Union. Extensive controls over the economy, a commitment to rapid growth, the
lack of an occupying power, and a firmly established political regime with no
domestic opposition would appear to be conducive conditions for economic
growth. Yet, the Soviets experienced a relatively long period of remarkably
low productivity growth after WWII. Certainly such factors as conversion to
and from military production, the state of repair of the capital stock,
bottlenecks and shortages in the supply of agricultural materials to
nonagricultural areas, hours adjustments of labor inputs, unmeasured changes
in the quality of labor, and the overall disorganizing effects of war, both
during the hostilities and after the conflict ended, affected input
productivity, and hence Soviet economic growth, at least until 1953.
The productivity estimates provided by Moorsteen and Powell are
problematic, however, because they are sensitive to interest rate estimates,
the method of aggregating inputs, and the adjustment of labor inputs for hours
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worked [7]. While it is abundantly clear that WWII altered factor
proportions, thereby influencing productivity, it is more difficult simply by
examining the data to identify the impact of the war on the level of
technology, on economies of scale and scale effects, or on efficiency, all of
which are determinants of productivity. These data need to be utilized in an
analytical framework which identifies the magnitude of the war effort. The
methodology employed below in generating war cost estimates provides one
possible analytical framework, and yields additional insight regarding the
impact of WWII on Soviet economic growth.
II. War Cost, Postwar Burden and Economic Growth
Measuring the economic impact of war necessarily employs an opportunity
cost approach where the opportunity cost, by comparing potential and actual
output levels, captures foregone civilian production and capacity expansion,
or alternatively, reduced civilian consumption, or additional work effort
required by the war [8]. Analyzing the impact of WWII on the Soviet economy
using an opportunity cost approach is appropriate whether war cost is measured
in terms of costs absorbed during the conflict (Millar and Linz 1978, 1980) or
costs absorbed in the postwar period (Linz 1983) because these are not
separate costs analytically, only temporally. Wartime costs include, for
example, direct government expenditures on the war effort, wartime loss of
national income because of damaged or destroyed factors of production, loss of
personal consumption resulting both from lower wartime national income and the
increased share of government expenditures in national income, reduced leisure
18
time, and extra effort and resources required to convert to wartime
production. War costs not absorbed during the conflict carryover into the
postwar period and include such components as the cost of continued lower
national income because of the net loss of factors of production, depleted
capital stock, reduced birthrates and labor force growth rates, and additional
medical costs for the wounded and disabled who demand special care after the
war ends. Carryover war cost does not represent any additional war cost,
however. Rather, the term is used to represent the extent to which unabsorbed
war cost is allocated to the postwar period thereby affecting economic growth
potential.
Linz (1983) provides 3 estimates of the carryover war cost for the Soviet
experience in WWII. The first estimate uses Soviet claims and sources to
establish a rough estimate of the carryover war cost absorbed between 1945 and
1953. To check whether this is a reasonable interpretation of the magnitude
of the postwar impact, the second estimate employs Soviet national income
data, and the third, aggregate output data in a production function
framework. An idea of the postwar burden imposed upon the Soviet people is
obtained by calculating each estimate in terms of years' earnings, or work
effort, of the 1945 labor force. The estimates range from 8 to 10 years'
earnings when considering only the material losses generated by WWII,
supporting the claim that WWII cost two Five-Year Plans. If war-related
population losses are taken into account, as they necessarily are in the
production function analysis, the carryover war cost estimates rise to 18 to
25 years' earnings.
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By any measure, the postwar impact of WWII imposed a tremendous burden on
the leadership's economic growth efforts, and upon the postwar population as a
whole. Indeed, the magnitude of these carryover war cost estimates put into
perspective Soviet reparation demands after WWII, and yield further insight
into the economic relationships established after the war between the USSR and
Eastern Europe. In the context of the debate regarding the origins of the
Cold War [9] i understanding the postwar impact of WWII and the extent to which
it was reduced by actual foreign assistance programs ("pipeline" Lend Lease,
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration funds, and
reparations) paves the way for an examination of the extent to which
additional foreign aid (the proposed US loan, Marshall Plan aid) would have
reduced the postwar burden, or carryover cost, of WWII to the Soviet people.
This section developes 3 separate measures of the impact of actual aid and
reparations on Soviet postwar recovery efforts. Similar analysis is conducted
for the potential aid programs. To facilitate comparison between the aid
impact estimates derived here (and the war cost estimates described above)
each is expressed in terms of years' earnings, or work effort required by the
1945 labor force to generate an equivalent impact domestically.
Impact of Actual Aid
The impact of actual reparation payments and other forms of economic
assistance on the Soviet economy has not previously been calculated, primarily
because of measurement problems. Attempts have been made, however, to
estimate total economic aid and reparations to the USSR between 1945 and
1953. The most comprehensive effort, found in Nutter (1962, pp. 351-4),
gives an estimate range of $9.1 to $21.2 billion. The smaller figure values
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aid and reparations in "1938 dollars", the higher estimate is in terms of
"current" or 1945 dollars. This range represents a lower bound estimate of
reparations and aid actually received because it does not take into account:
proceeds from joint stock companies established in East European countries;
transit privileges; discriminatory trading prices (except for Polish coal);
levies for support of occupation troops and administration; forced labor of
war prisoners and interns; or the value of machinery and equipment in occupied
territories dismantled by Soviet occupation forces before the end of the war.
Moreover, Nutter (p. 353) concludes that these figures understate the true
value of reparations received, whether valued in 1938 or 1945 prices, because
prices of goods and services received as reparations were discounted
substantially in favor of the USSR.
To determine the impact on Soviet postwar recovery efforts of this lower
bound estimate of reparations and aid received between 1945 and 1953 requires
of conversion of the estimates from dollar to ruble values. Pick (1959, p. 343)
reports the official exchange rate during the war and immediate postwar period
at 5.3 rubles to $1. Using the official exchange rate, however, fails to
provide a meaningful measure of either the true value or significance of
reparation payments or other forms of economic aid to the USSR. As Holzman
(1968, p. 814) points out, the official exchange rate "has served as little
more than an accounting device for converting foreign currency prices of
Soviet exports and imports into rubles for the purposes of constructing
foreign trade accounts in local currency."
During the 1930s and 1940s, exchange rates between the ruble and other
foreign currencies were set arbitrarily by the Soviet government. The ruble
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was grossly overvalued as judged by any comparison of its purchasing power
with the purchasing power of nominally equal amounts of dollars, pounds, and
so on. During WWII, official exchange rates remained unchanged, despite the
great inflation of nonrationed consumer goods. Holzman (1968) therefore
offers an alternative exchange rate range, based on comparisons of domestic
and foreign price trends, of 2.5 to 3.5 rubles to $1 for the postwar period.
While his exchange rates provide a more accurate picture than one based on the
official rate, they are not quite appropriate for the purposes of this paper
because they deal almost exclusively with exports, without considering the
differences in degrees of overvaluation of exports and imports. Moreover,
because domestic prices in the immediate postwar period did not accurately
reflect costs of production, the ratio between world market prices and
domestic prices is understated.
A more meaningful method of converting dollar values into ruble values to
determine the magnitudes these reparation and aid estimates represent in the
postwar Soviet economy is derived using Lend Lease information. First, Lend
Lease aid was similar to postwar aid and reparations in that it was
constrained by available supplies. Second, both ruble and dollar estimates of
Lend Lease aid are readily available, although both the Soviets and US would
have a tendency to misrepresent the actual value of Lend Lease aid. The
Soviets claim that Lend Lease aid amounted to 5 billion rubles. They also
state that Lend Lease aid came to about 4 percent of their wartime national
income (Tamarchenko, p. 57, Cherniavski, 1964, pp. 19-20). US records show
Lend Lease aid to the USSR totalled some $11 bilion by the end of 1945 (Jones,
1945). The first claim, 5 billion rubles to $11 billion, results in a ruble-
dollar exchange rate of .5R to $1.
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Calculating an exchange rate based on the second claim requires an
estimate of Soviet national income during the war, Yw. Available Soviet
sources do not contain estimates of wartime national income, but do provide
national income indices (1940=100) for the war period: 92 in 1941, 66 in 1942,
77 in 1943. 88 in 1944, and 83 in 1945 (Kravchenko, p. 351). Bergson and
Heymann (1954, p. 24) estimate the 1940 level of national income at 45.8
billion rubles (1940 prices). Hence, Yw equals 184 billion rubles, and Lend
Lease aid (at 4 percent of Yw) totalled some 7.4 billion rubles, yielding a
second exchange rate estimate of .7R to $1. For comparison purposes, results
using each exchange rate described above are provided in Table 11.
Using the Holzman and Lend Lease exchange rates, the impact of reparations
and economic aid on Soviet postwar recovery is examined first by calculating
the ruble value of reparations and aid as a percent of cumulative postwar
national income, Ypw. Once again, available Soviet sources do not provide
estimates of national income for the period 1945-1953, but do contain national
income indicies (1940=100) for this period: 85 in 1945 (Kravchenko, p. 351),
78 in 1946 ( Narodnoe khoziaistvo , 1970, p. 533), 93 and 116 in 1947- 48
( Ekonomicheskaia zhizn , book 1, 1967, p. 411), 136 and 164 in 1949-50
(Vikentev, 1957, p. 140), 184 and 204 in 1951-52 ( Narodnoe khoziaistvo , 1956,
p. 36), 204 in 1953 [10]. Hence. Ypw totalled 577.7 billion rubles (1940
prices) between 1945 and 1953. Holzman' s exchange rates yield reparations and
aid estimates ranging from 22.8 to 73.8 billion rubles between 1945 and 1953
(Table 11: lines b,f), implying a 4 to 13% contribution to postwar national
income during this period (lines eg). Lend Lease exchange rates result In an
aid estimate range of 4.6 to 14.8 billion rubles, contributing some 1 to 3% of
cumulative (1945-1953) national income.
Table II: Actual and Potential Aid Estimates, 1945-1953
a. Actual Aid
b. 1938 prices
c. % Ypw
d. A Ql*
e. A Q2**
f. 1945 prices
g- % Ypw
h. A Ql
i. A Q2
Dollar values Ruble values
(billions) (billions)
9.1
Official Holzman Lend Lease
5.38 to 1 3.5R 2.5R .7R .5R
21.2
48.2 31.8 22.8 6.4 4.6
8.3 5.5 3.9 1.1 0.8
28.3 21.2 6.9 5.1
2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6
111.8 73.8 52.8 14.8 10.5
19.4 12.8 9.1 2.6 1.8
59.4 48.2 14.5 10.7
2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8
j. Potential Aid
k. loan + ERP1 2.4 12.7 8.4 6.0 1.7 1.2
1. % Ypw 2.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 0.2
ra. A Ql 6.5 1.4
n. A Q2 1.7 1.3
o loan + ERP2 4.2 22.3 14.7 10.5 2.9 2.1
p. % Ypw 3.9 2.5 1.8 0.5 0.4
q. A Ql 14.6 3.6
r. A Q2 1.9 1.5
Source: see text.
*Change in aggregate output when all aid goes to capital formation.
**Change in aggregate output when all aid goes to labor or wage goods,
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An idea of the contribution made by reparation payments and economic aid
is found in a comparison with the amount of work effort required to generate
an equivalent amount of national income domestically. That is, to generate a
similar total increase in national income would have taken the 1945 labor
force of 27.2 million workers and salaried officials (Zaleski, p. 607),
earning an average 521 rubles per year ( Trud , 1968, p. 138), between 1.6 and 5
years' earnings based on Holzman's exchange rates, or 4 months' to 1 years'
earnings using Lend Lease exchange rates. This compares with total material
war cost estimates of between 3 and 7 years' earnings of the 1940 labor force
(Millar and Linz 1978 1980, Saryadar 1980) [11]. Had reparations and aid not
been received, the burden of WWII upon the Soviet people would have been
appreciably higher.
An alternative method of analyzing the impact of economic aid and
reparation payments between 1945 and 1953 uses aggregate output data within a
production function framework to relate output to available supplies of
capital and labor. Actual levels of aggregate output cited in Soviet sources
for 1945 to 1953 clearly include all reparation payments and economic aid
received during this period. What would the level of output have been without
reparation payments or economic aid? A graphical interpretation is useful for
illustrating a number of feasible decision rules regarding reparations and aid
which Soviet planners would necessarily have faced in 1945. Figure 1
identifies pre and post aid output levels. Given the Soviet system of central
planning and priorities, it makes no sense to assume that capital and labor
receive their marginal products, hence the price ratios have been omitted from
Figure 1.
Pigure 1
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Prior to receiving aid. the economy operates at point A, given existing
technology and actual stocks of capital and labor. When reparations and other
economic assistance became available, one decision rule would have allowed for
the entire amount of aid to go toward capital formation. Under this decision
rule, the original capital stock would be augmented by the foreign resource
inflow from KO to Kl , shifting the isoquant out from QO, the non-reparations
level of output, to Ql . Because labor has been constrained to its original
level, LO, by this decision rule, point B marks the relevant combination of
capital and labor used to produce Ql . A similar analysis follows for a
decision rule which allows all aid to go toward labor or consumer goods.
Alternatively, Soviet planners would necessarily have considered the
impact on aggregate output of using aid to augment both capital and labor.
Under this decision rule, in addition to acquiring capital goods, aid would
also have been used to purchase foodstuffs or other consumer goods for
payments- in-kind to attract youths, women, and demobilized soldiers to the
cities or industrial centers where these goods were in short supply. As seen
in Figure 1, this yields a greater impact on output than that resulting from
using all aid in either capital or labor formation. Output reaches a maximum,
Q2, under the assumption of perfect convertibility of foreign resource inflow
(reparations and other economic aid) to the optimal levels of capital (K2) and
labor (L2). The contribution of reparations and other economic aid must fall
within the range defined by QO and Q2.
Translating this graphical interpretation into actual figures requires
certain information regarding the structural parameters of the Soviet economy
in the postwar period — elasticities of output with respect to capital and
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labor, and a technology measure, for example. Estimating a production
function for the postwar period yields precisely these parameters. Results
obtained using a Cobb-Douglas specification and the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation procedure are shown in Table 12.
Under the first decision rule where all aid goes to capital formation, the
contribution of reparations and other aid to aggregate output would have
fallen within the range of 21.1 to 59.4 billion rubles using Holzman's
exchange rates (Table 11: lines d,h) and CD1 parameters (Table 12), or between
1 and 3% of cumulative postwar aggregate output (Moorsteen and Powell, p.
361). To produce an equivalent increase in aggregate output domestically
would have required the 1945 labor force to work between 1.5 and 4.2 years.
This compares with a similar impact estimate of 1.6 to 5 years' earnings based
on national income data. Using the aid estimate derived from Lend Lease
exchange rates, this decision rule implies a contribution of some 5.1 to 14.5
billion rubles (Table 11: lines d,h), requiring additional work effort of 3
months to 1 year, which again is very similar to estimates derived above based
on national income data. Had all aid gone to augment labor (Table 11: lines
e,i), the corresponding impact on output would have been much less, between
1.7 and 2.3 billion rubles, requiring some 1.5 to 2 months additional work
effort to generate an equivalent impact domestically.
None of these estimates, however, represents the maximum impact
reparations and aid would have had upon output for at least two important
reasons. Looking only at the impact on output of augmenting either capital or
labor ignores the long-run effects of net additions to capital stock or
labor. This aspect might be examined within the context of a Harrod-Domar
Table 12: Estimated Parameters of a Cobb-Douglas* Production Function
for the Soviet Economy. 1945-61
Bo Bl ESS
CD1** 3.86 .88
standard error .020 .052
t-statistic 66.7 16.9
07997 .9501
CD2*** 2.00 .89
standard error .051 .052
t-statistic 13.6 17.1
.07809 .9513
Source: Moorsteen and Powell (1966, pp. 352-365).
* To reduce problems of multicolinearity and heteroskedasticity . the
Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated in intensive form
(Intriligator 1978. pp. 150-95). For further discussion of
specification and parameter values see Linz (1983).
**q = nonagricultural NNP, 1937 prices; K = nonagricultural capital
services valued at 8% interest rate, 1937 prices; L = nonagricultural
employment, adjusted for changes in hours, 1937 man-years.
***Q nonagricultural NNP, 1937 prices; K = nonagricultural capital
services valued at 20% interest rate, 1937 prices; L =
nonagricultural employment, adjusted for changes in hours, 1937
man-years
.
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type growth model. In addition, because it makes no sense to assume perfect
competition where capital and labor receive their marginal products given the
Soviet system of central planning and priorities, only the boundary solutions
can be determined (that is, all aid going to either capital formation or
labor). Allocating reparations and other economic aid optimally between
capital and labor would necessarily have had a greater impact on aggregate
output than any of the estimates obtained above. Moreover, as stated above,
the reparation and aid estimate itself is a lower bound estimate.
These results indicate that, whether measured with respect to national
income or aggregate output, the impact of reparations and economic aid was
substantial. Roughly measured, to generate an equivalent increase in income or
output would have required additional work effort by the postwar labor force
of some 3 months' to 1 years' earnings (1.5 to 5 years' earnings using
Holzman's exchange rates). Had the Soviets not received any postwar
assistance, the postwar burden, or carryover cost of WWII to the Soviet
people, would have been markedly greater than current estimates indicate (Linz
1983).
Impact of Potential Aid
Soviet reconstruction efforts were aided significantly by reparations,
pipeline Lend Lease, and UNRRA assistance. Each of these, however,
represented a source of conflict between the US, Great Britain, France, and
USSR. The earliest and most pervasive source of conflict arose over Soviet
reparations claims, especially with respect to Germany. Discord over Poland,
Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia after the Potsdam Agreement further
inflamed the reparations issue, and the tenuous relationship between the
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Allies began deteriorating rapidly. Lend Lease posed another source of
postwar confrontation specifically between the US and USSR. The US did not
like the sporadic releases to the Soviet press during the war press which
never really informed the Soviet people of the importance of Lend Lease to
their war effort, nor did the Soviets like Truman's abrupt termination of Lend
Lease once Germany surrendered. Soviet-American confrontation also arose
over UNRRA aid. Although UNRRA had been organized and funded (primarily by
the US) to provide food, medical care and other assistance to war-devastated
areas, protests intensified in the immediate postwar period that UNRRA funds
(US dollars) were being used to fund Communist expansion. As a result, UNRRA
assistance was cancelled in 1946, despite existing economic conditions in the
USSR and Eastern Europe.
In place of the increasingly unpopular Lend Lease and UNRRA aid, the US
proposed a loan of $1 billion in 1945 to aid Soviet reconstruction efforts.
Discussions of a loan to the USSR had been initiated much earlier, however.
US Ambassador Harriman went to Moscow in October 1943 to meet with A.I.
Mikoyan (Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade) to talk about US assistance in
their reconstruction efforts. Indeed, the loan was perceived by business and
government leaders alike as a way to help avoid the anticipated postwar
depression in the US. In January 1945, Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) met
with Harriman with the Soviet's first formal request for a postwar loan of $6
billion. By this time, conflicting interests with respect to the Soviet
Union's reconstruction efforts were evident, and the loan had become more of a
diplomatic tool than an economic opportunity. In spite of cooling relations
between the US and USSR, however, Harriman informed the Soviets in August 1945
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that the Export-Import Bank was willing to consider Soviet proposals for
postwar aid, and at Truman's request, $1 billion was earmarked by the Bank for
possible loan to the USSR.
Negotiations were stalled and the loan "lost" for the first 6 months of
1946 while the US State Department waited, hoping Soviet reconstruction needs
would require them to come to the US to make concessions regarding reparations
and other issues, and the Moscow waited, believing the US needed to finance
exports to the USSR to head off a depression. By the end of 1946, the loan
was no longer a current issue and the general question of US assistance in
Soviet reconstruction efforts was not mentioned again until June 1947, when
Secretary of State Marshall gave his famous commencement speech at Harvard
offering a general plan for European recovery.
When the US offered the Soviet Union economic assistance under the
"Marshall Plan" in 1947, the Soviet leadership declined participation. A
number of Western scholars contend that the aid was offered in such a way as
to preclude any real participation by the USSR [13]. Had they agreed to join
in what became known as the European Recovery Program, what amount of aid
could the Soviets have expected? Between April 1948 and June 1952, the
European Recovery Program gave over $13 billion in aid (Ferrell, 1978, p. 86).
Over half of this sum was distributed among Great Britain, France, and Italy.
Germany received approximately $1.4 billion. Assuming that another
participant in ERP would have changed the relative shares, rather than the
total funds appropriated by Congress, yields an upper bound estimate of
potential aid to the USSR equalling the share actually granted to Great
Britain, $3.2 billion. Political conditions at the time, however, suggest
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that this sum might be high. Alternatively, it is possible to assume that the
Soviet Union would have received as much as Germany, the perpetrator of WWII.
The traditional story implies that the impact of these two potential aid
programs would have been substantial, allowing the Soviets to recover their
prewar economic capacity much more rapidly and/or easily than actually
occurred. It is useful, therefore, to compare these potential programs with
those actually received because it is quite clear that the loan and ERP aid
were offered as substitutes for continued reparation payments and other
existing (or terminated) aid programs. As indicated above, the loan and ERP
assistance at best would have amounted to some $2.4 to $4.2 billion from 1945
to 1953 (Table 11: lines k,o). This represents 6 to 15 billion rubles using
Holzman's exchange rates, or 1 to 3 billion rubles using Lend Lease exchange
rates. As such, these two potential aid programs would have amounted roughly
to some .2 to 2.5% of cumulative postwar national income (lines l.p),
representing approximately 5 months' to 1 years' earnings of the 1945
workforce using Holzman's exchange rates, 1 to 3 months using Lend Lease
exchange rates.
Using the aggregate production function analysis described above, under
the first decision rule where all aid goes to capital formation (Table 11:
lines m,q), output would have increased by 6.5 to 14.6 billion rubles using
Holzman's exchange rates, or 1.4 to 3.6 billion rubles using Lend Lease
exchange rates. To generate a similar increase domestically would have
required additional work effort by the 1945 workforce of 1 month to 1 years'
earnings. Under the second decision rule where all aid goes to augment labor
(lines n,r), output would have increased by 1.7 to 1.9 billion rubles
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(Holzman's exchange rates), or 1.3 to 1.5 billion rubles (Lend Lease exchange
rates), requiring some 1 to 2 months' additional work effort to generate an
equivalent increase domestically.
Calculated in this rough manner, and compared to the cost of WWII to the
Soviet people, the potential impact of receiving the loan and ERP assistance
was relatively modest. This is especially striking in comparison with the
impact of actual reparations and aid. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that the loan or ERP aid would have been insignificant. It is possible to
conceive of a situation where it would have been significant at the margin.
That is, the loan and ERP aid would necessarily have been used to eliminate
bottlenecks in the economy (electricity generation, or improving transport
facilities, for example) by acquiring the most effective technology or
facilities. Reparations, on the other hand, did not represent state-of-the
art technology or equipment. As such, ERP funds might have allowed for an
earlier recovery of the prewar level of output, or, for example, legislation
which made it imperative for women and youths to remain in the workforce after
the war might not have been necessary. There is no a priori reason to think,
however, that a marginal rather than an average capital-output ratio is
relevant for analyzing the impact of these potential aid programs upon Soviet
reconstruction efforts since a large section of European Russia was fought
over with a "scorched earth" policy twice [14].
A simple four equation model may be employed to simulate the impact of
additional aid on the size or productive capacity of the postwar economy to
check the reasonableness of the estimates derived above. The equations are
written below in their estimating form. An underlying assumption of this
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model is that potential aid enters the Soviet economy as additional
investment.
The Cobb-Douglas production function (equation 1) as estimated above (see
Table 12) is employed to relate aggregate nonagricultural output to capital
and labor.
For a closed economy, the relationship between investment and capital
accumulation is given by the following accounting identity:
(2) Kt-1) = K(t) - K(t-l) + R(t)
where I is gross annual investment in fixed capital (Moorsteen and Powell,
p. 358); K, the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of time period t
(Moorsteen and Powell, p. 315), and R is the annual retirement of the capital
stock. For any t, the following behavioral relationship is expected:
(2.1) R(t) = [l-p]K(t)
where the annual rate of depreciation is given by [1-p]. Write (2.1) for
period t-1 and insert into (2):
(2.2) Kt-1) S K(t) - K(t-l) = [l-p]K(t-l)
which yields, in estimating form:
(2.3) K(t) = pK(t-l) + gl(t-l) + u(t)
where g is expected to equal 1.
Investment in this model depends upon the current level of planned output
and the previous period's level of investment. That is, assume investment is
the process of adjusting the level of actual capital stock, K, to the desired
level, K*:
(3) i(t) = K*(t) - K(t-l).
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Assuming K* is proportional to the desired level of output, Q*
(3.1) K*(t) = bQ*(t)
implies that:
(3.2) I(t) = bQ*(t) = K(t-l).
Let g(l) be a proxy for K where:
t-1
J I dt.
t=0
K(t)=
Then, written in estimating form:
(3.4) I(t) = a(2) + b(2)Q(t) + g(2)I(t-l) + z(t).
Finally, employment is assumed to grow at an exogenously determined rate:
(4) lnL(t) = lnL(O) + win t + e(t)
where L is nonagricultural employment in man-years (Moorsteen and Powell, p.
365).
The system of four equations is recursive (that is, no two endogenous
variables are determined in the same time period), so each equation can be
estimated individually. Estimation results for the production function are
shown in Table 12. Calculating the mean average percentage error (MAPE)
indicates that this specification of the production function forecasts with a
2% error on average. A more conservative criterion, the root mean squared
error (RMSE) , was found to be 2.6% [15]. Errors arising from simulation and
forecasting will, therefore, range between 2 and 2.6% on average.
Estimating equation (2.3) using OLS yields the following results:
K(t) = .941KU-1) + 1.346IU-1)
-2
standard error .038 .302 R =.9990
t-statistic 24.88 4.45 D.W.=2.7776
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implying that about 6% of the capital stock depreciates annually. This
corresponds closely with Moorsteen and Powell's findings of 5 to 7% annual
depreciation. The relatively high standard error of the investment
coefficient indicates its instability. The fact that the interval in which
the estimate lies spans from 1 to 1.6 may be explained by the limitations of
the data. Changes in investment and capital stock are highly correlated over
time and the reduced form equation used here is not picking up the exact
relationship between the two with respect to depreciation.
In spite of data problems, equation (2.3) simulates and forecasts actual
values rather well. The deviation of estimated values from actual values
falls between 1 and 2%. In addition, it generates an investment elasticity of
.09, which is consistent with the expected relationship between investment
expenditures and actual capital stock. That is, the change in capital stock
should equal net investment, and annual investment should be about 10% of
capital stock to include replacement as well as net additions to maintain
economic growth.
Estimating equation (3.5) yields the following results:
I(t) = -5.451 + .102Q(t) + .766IU-1)
— 2
standard error .038 .123 R = .9920
t-statistic 19.21 6.21 D.W. = 1.23
This specification of the investment function does not track as well as the
previous two equations. On average, the forecasting error ranges between 5
and 7%.
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Lastly, estimating (4):
lnL(t) = 3.038 + ,045t
-2
standard error .002 R =.9270
t-statistic 19.21 D.W. = .2960
Calculating the MAPE and RMSE yields a forecasting error range of about 2-3%.
It is now possible to determine the extent to which an exogenous change in
investment would have affected Soviet aggregate output in the postwar period.
To calculate the impact and long-run multipliers, it is first necessary to
approximate the nonlinear production function using a linearized version. A
Taylor series expansion of the production function yields capital and labor
coefficients of .32 and .68 respectively, with 1949 as the base year. Solving
the system of difference equations and differentiating with respect to a(2)
(see equation 3.4) yields an impact multiplier of .43. That is, for a given
exogenous change in investment of 1 billion rubles in time t, for example,
aggregate output will rise by some 430 million rubles in period t+2. The
total effect of such a change in investment on aggregate output was found to
be an increase of 9.35 billion rubles.
The magnitudes of both the impact and long-run multipliers are intuitively
appealing for several reasons. The relatively small impact multiplier
relfects the chronic difficulties of carrying out investment plans cited in
Soviet sources. The long-run effects indicate both the fact that investment
plans are used to eliminate bottlenecks in the economy, especially after WWII,
and the rather low efficiency of investment resulting from the wide dispersion
of investment projects and delays arising from unfinished construction
(Lokshin 1937, 1952). To determine the responsiveness of aggregate output to
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changes in the level of investment, the investment elasticity was calculated
and found to be approximately .10 for the postwar period, 1945-53.
Calculation of these multipliers and the elasticity of investment allows
for determination of the effect of potential foreign assistance on postwar
aggregate output. Had the $1 billion loan been granted in 1946 and used to
purchase industrial machinery and equipment, for example, aggregate investment
would have been 2-11% higher in 1946-47. The impact of such an exogenous
increase in investment would not be evident in the economy immediately. Given
an elasticity of .10, a substantial change in aggregate output is not expected
to occur in the short-run. The model presented above indicates a 2-period lag
before aggregate output would rise. Hence, an additional .5 to 3.5 billion
rubles of investment in 1947 would result in an increase in aggregate output
of .21 to 1.5 billion rubles by 1949, generating a total increase of some 4.7
to 32.7 billion rubles. Similarly, had the Soviets received $1.4 to $3.2
billion of ERP funds in 1948 (best scenario possible), aggregate investment
would have increased by some 3.5 to 11 billion rubles (using Holzman's
exchange rates) or .7 to 2.2 billion (using Lend Lease exchange rates). The
impact of such an exogenous increase in investment would have driven aggregate
output up by some .3 to 5 billion rubles by 1950.
The combined effect of these potential aid programs is clearly much less
than that of reparation payments during the same period. This is evident in a
comparison of the additional work effort of some 1 months' to 1 years'
earnings required by the labor force to generate domestically an impact
similar to that of the potential aid programs. Similar results are provided
by Leontief (see Appendix) on the basis of analysis conducted in 1944 for the
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OSS. Indeed, his results coincide very closely with those derived using Lend
Lease aid estimates. Viewed in isolation, these figures are substantial.
Relative to the magnitude of the postwar burden, or carryover cost of WWII to
the Soviet people (Linz 1983), however, these estimates appear modest.
III. Speculations on the Cost of Winning WWII
Although the total real cost of WWII to the Soviet Union has yet to be
fully measured, there is not doubt that the economic cost of the war imposed a
tremendous burden upon the Soviet people, both in absolute terms and relative
to other participants. A significant portion of total material war cost
carried over into the postwar period, adversely affecting economic growth
efforts. In large part, certain costs were made unavoidable for the USSR by
the onset of the Cold War. There is, however, no a priori reason to believe
that the net effect (cost) of WWII was negative when taking into account
political and social factors. Acquisition of new territory and new
technology, in addition to the political and social cohesion resulting from
sustaining a successful war effort, are benefits which have been omitted from
the economic analysis presented here. Furthermore, little emphasis was placed
on the role of actual reparation payments in Soviet postwar recovery efforts.
Considering the magnitude of reparation payments relative to potential foreign
assistance implies that Stalin was perfectly rational in refusing to make
political concessions in return for US economic assistance after WWII.
Moreover, considering only the absolute amount of aid ignores the significance
of the marginal contribution, which might well have been vital.
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Unfortunately, insight into this aspect benefits more from hindsight than from
counterfactual analysis.
There are also other costs of "winning" which have not been explicitly
discussed which quite possibly imposed an additional burden upon the Soviet
population. Costs of occupation and costs of emerging from WWII as a major
military power, have necessitated disproportionately large annual expenditures
for defense. In contrast to the US economy where defense spending ordinarily
creates jobs, generating additional national income, the burden of a high
level of defense expenditures in the Soviet economy is real in the sense that
the size of the economy, or level of national income, is fixed and increasing
the share of output for defense purposes causes a "crowding out" of the
provision of consumer goods. In this sense, the economic consequences of WWII
Footnotes
1. I thank Larry Neal for suggesting this term to describe the postwar
burden of WWII to the Soviet people.
2. Further discussion of evacuation and occupation loss is found in
Istoriya
, vol II, 1963, p. 148; Chaedaev. 1965, p. 65; Eshelony , 1960, pp.
108. 140; and Kravchenko, 1970, pp. 123-25.
3. A comparison of the share of wartime defense outlays with the 1940 level
is somewhat misleading because the share of defense outlays had already begun
to rise sharply by 1940 in anticipation of war. Defense outlays in 1937, for
example, represented only 17% of all budget non-financial uses of funds. Yet
by 1940 this category had reached some 34%. See Millar (p. 112).
4. The population of the Soviet Union was reduced by 7 million during the
course of WWII, from 198 to 191 million. Taking into account the prewar
population growth rate of 2.5 % per annum implies a total loss in population
of some 20 million. A total "loss" of over 50 million people by 1959
(compared to the expected population at that time) is given in V.V.
Pokshinshevskii, Geographiia naseleniia SSSR; ekonomiko-geograficheskie
orcherki (Moscow, 1971), p. 34.
5. On January 1, 1961, the Soviet government revalued the ruble, ten rubles
equalling one new one. Unless otherwise noted, ruble figures given in the
remainder of this paper are in new rubles.
6. Lorimar (1946, p. 148) reports 20.1 million people in the newly acquired
territory. Bergson and Heymann (1954, p. 6) put this figure at 23.6 million.
7. A complete discussion of this problem is found in Moorsteen and Powell,
pp. 255-73.
8. Calculating potential output by projecting a prewar output trend into the
postwar period cannot accurately represent an estimate of what the course of
output would have been in the absence of WWII, but it does make clear the
nature of the loss in output which the war, in all its consequences,
entailed. For example, Soviet data indicate that had it been possible to
maintain the output growth rate indicated by the prewar trend (6.1% annually
1928-1937, 5.9% 1936-1939, in 1937 prices), the absolute volume of output
realized in each postwar year would have been attained 6 to 7 years earlier.
Alternatively, the absolute value of output based on the prewar growth trend
would have exceeded actual output from 1945 to 1950 by some 50%.
9. The origins of the Cold War have been the subject of controversey for
over 2 decades. The traditional view assigns initiation of the Cold War to
the Soviet Union, interpreting US actions as responses to Soviet policies in
Poland and Eastern Europe. The literature abounds with the traditional
viewpoint. See, for example, Mosley (1949), Schlesinger (1967), Feis (1970).
Revisionists do not see US foreign policy after WWII as merely responding to
Soviet initiatives. Rather, they see US leaders using diplomatic policy and
economic sanctions to try to shape the postwar world in accordance with US
needs, standards, and conceptions. See especially Alperovitz (1965), Gardner
(1970), Kuklick (1972). For a representative discussion of differences and
attempts to classify writers into "schools" see Maier (1970), Graebner (1969),
Morganthau (1967).
10. Calculations in terms of the 1945 workforce are higher than those based
on 1940 figures because of the reduced size of the postwar workforce. For
complete discussion see Linz (1983).
11. There is no question that Lend Lease food shipments alleviated serious
Soviet shortages during the war. Shattered Red Army communication systems
were rebuilt using Lend Lease equipment. Lend Lease supplied specialized
steels and alloys, allowing Soviet efforts to concentrate on the production of
basic types of steel. Moreover, Lend Lease aid was not entirely consumed by
the war effort. Electric power machinery, a complete rubber tire factory,
equipment for drilling and refining petroleum, and technical knowledge were
all valuable in Soviet reconstruction efforts. It is clear, then, why the
abrupt termination of Lend Lease cause the Soviets so much concern. For an
excellent discussion of Lend Lease aid see Martel (1979).
12. The State Department argued that the food crisis was over (apparently
disregarding the 1946 Soviet harvest), and that UNRRA aid was no longer
necessary to war-ravaged countries since they were capable of importing
necessary goods. In early 1947, however, the United Nations' Food and
Agricultureal Organization estimated a world grain shortage in that year of
about 8 million tons. Furthermore, evidence indicates that Poland needed $200
million for imports for 1947 to maintain a minimum individual daily
subsistence of 1,800 calories, and relief deficits for Austria, Greece,
Hungary, Italy and China totaled $596 million for 1947 (Paterson p. 88).
Perhaps a better explanation for UNRRA termination was the increasing
awareness in Washington of the value of economic assistance as a diplomatic
tool. The apolitical nature of UNRRA policy was not well-liked — US
officials wanted influence over the final distribution of UNRRA funds. This
position is exemplified by US response to the Soviet request in 1945 for $700
million for reconstruction in the Ukraine and Beylorussia, a request which
required the appropriation of more funds to the UNRRA general fund. The US,
however, was unwilling to make the appropriation, supplying instead only a
fraction of the amount requested. To make up the difference, the US suggested
that the Soviets apply for a loan, which the US then failed to grant.
13. Although Marshall invited European nations to undertake a joint economic
reconstruction plan with US assistance, the "Marshall Plan" in a manner
similar to the Truman Doctrine, equated economic recovery with political
stability, an ti-Communism, and security against Soviet expansion. In
addition, the French and British feared that the inclusion of the USSR would
foreclose Congressional support for a European recovery program, and therefore
took a decidely cool attitude toward the Soviets at he Paris conference of the
three foreign ministers. For a distribution of Marshall Plan aid and further
discussion see Patterson and Polk (1947), Paterson (1978).
14. Prior to, and concurrent with the German invasion in June 1941, the
Soviets transferred to the East all moveable capital stock, and deliberately
sought to destroy everything which could not be removed. The Germans also
succeeded in destroying a large portion of the remaining capital stock during
their retreat in 1943. For descriptions of the military campaigns and general
history of WWII, see Clark (1966), Hart (1971), and Seaton (1971).
15. The mean average percentage error (MAPE) is calculated by dividing the
sum of the values by the sume of the errors, giving equal weights to all
errors. The root mean squared error (RMSE) penalizes the large errors by
weighting them more since it is calculated by summing the squared errors
divided by the number of observations, then dividing by the sum of the values
divided by n. The RMSE is a more conservative criterion because it is always
larger than the MAPE.
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